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Martin Gairing
In this work, we study the problem of users selfishly routing traffic
through a shared network. Users route their unsplittable traffic by choosing
a path from their source to their destination with the aim of minimizing
their private cost, which are defined as their expected latency. This often
contradicts the goal of optimizing the social cost, which measures the global
performance of the whole network. We model such environments by selfish
routing games, where the network users are assumed to be selfish players.
In such routing games, a Nash equilibrium represents a stable state of the
system in which no player can improve its latency by unilaterally chang-
ing its strategy. The price of anarchy measures the maximum performance
degradation due to the selfish behaviour of the players.
In the first model, the network consists only of a single source and a
single destination which are connected by parallel links. In such a routing
game on parallel links, link latency functions are linear and the players
have complete information about the system and the other players. For
this model, we present results concerning the computational complexity of
pure Nash equilibria. Furthermore, we prove a multitude of results that are
related to the price of anarchy in various sub-models.
In the second model, called model of weighted congestion games, there
is a set of resources and each player can choose as its strategy a subset of
a given set of subsets of resources. The players have again complete infor-
mation. Weighted congestion games provide us with a general framework
for modeling any kind of non-cooperative resource sharing problem – not
only that of routing. In this dissertation, we show exact values for the price
of anarchy of weighted and unweighted congestion games with polynomial
latency functions.
In the third part of this work, we define a selfish routing game with in-
complete information that we call Bayesian routing game. Here, we again
restrict the network to parallel links with linear latency functions. How-
ever, players do not know each other’s traffic. For Bayesian routing games,
we prove results on the existence and computational complexity of pure
Bayesian Nash equilibria, we study structural properties of certain Bayesian
Nash equilibria, and we prove bounds on the price of anarchy for various
social cost measures.
